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International Court of Justice 
New Zealand's Request for an Examination of the Situation in 
accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's 1974 Judgment in the 
Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v France) 
On 22 September 1995 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its 
Order dismissing the case brought by New Zealand against France over French 
proposals to conduct a series of eight underground nuclear weapons tests at 
Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in the South Pacific starting in September 1995. 
The action raised by New Zealand, stemming as it did from concerns that the 
proposed tests would adversely affect the marine environment by way of 
radioactive pollution, was an attempt to have the ICJ re-open the Nuclear Tests 
Case involving the parties, instigated by New Zealand in 1 973. 
In bringing the 1995 action, New Zealand argued that para. 63 of the ICJ's 
Judgment rendered on 20 December 1974 provided for the continuation of the 
action at a later date if the basis of the 1974 decision was affected by subsequent 
French actions. On 13 June 1995, President Chirac announced to the media that 
France intended to undertake a programme of nuclear weapons tests in the 
region. This, New Zealand submitted, affected the basis of the ICJ's decision of 
1974 thereby permitting that case to be re-opened. Some explanation of the 
Nuclear Tests Case is required as background to the new Request. 
The Judgment of the ICJ in the case of New Zealand v France given on 20 
December 19742 
The action raised by the New Zealand Government on 9 May 1973 sought a 
determination from the ICJ to the effect that the conduct by the French 
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Government of nuclear tests in the South Pacific region which gave rise to 
radioactive fall-out constituted a violation of New Zealand's rights under 
international law and that these rights would be violated by any further tests.3 
3 
No final decision was reached by the ICJ. In the course of 1974 the French 
authorities made a number of undertakings which the ICJ interpreted as being 
tantamount to legally binding commitments not to carry out further atmo- 
spheric4 nuclear tests. 
The ICJ concluded that "the objective of the Applicant has in effect been 
accomplished, in as much as the Court finds that France has undertaken the 
obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South 
Pacific".5 Accordingly, as New Zealand no longer had an object in the case the 
ICJ declared, by nine votes to six, that it was not called upon to give a decision.6 
The Court did, however, make a proviso in para. 63 of its Judgment and it is 
on the basis of this paragraph that New Zealand raised the recent action. 
Paragraph 63 runs as follows: 
"63. Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment 
concerning its future conduct it is not the Court's function to contemplate 
that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis 
of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an 
examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute; the denunciation by France, by letter dated 2 January 1974, of the 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which is 
relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot constitute by 
itself an obstacle to the presentation of such a request. ,7 
The ICJ left open the possibility that New Zealand might successfully request 
a resumption of the case in the event that France subsequently failed to comply 
with its undertakings regarding atmospheric testing thereby "affecting" the 
"basis" of the Judgment. 
The Basis of New Zealand's Request of 21 August 1995 
New Zealand's Request was based upon its interpretation of para. 63 of the 
earlier Judgment. It stated that the rights for which it sought protection all fell 
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within the scope of the rights invoked in its Application of 1973 and that, even 
within this context, it only sought recognition of those rights which would be 
adversely affected by entry into the marine environment of radioactive material 
as a result of further tests to be carried out at Mururoa or Fangataufa Atolls 
together with recognition that it was entitled to protection and to the benefit of a 
properly conducted Environmental Impact Assessment.8 
8 
New Zealand requested the ICJ to adjudge and declare: 
"(i) that the conduct of the proposed nuclear tests will constitute a violation 
of the rights under international law of New Zealand, as well as of other 
States; further or in the alternative; 
(ii) that it is unlawful for France to conduct such nuclear tests before it has 
undertaken an Environmental Impact Assessment according to accepted 
international standards. Unless such an assessment establishes that the tests 
will not give rise, directly or indirectly, to radioactive contamination of the 
marine environment the rights under international law of New Zealand, as 
well as the rights of other States, will be violated."9 
In addition to the foregoing New Zealand also requested provisional 
measures, as follows: 
"(1) that France refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests at 
Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls; 
(2) that France undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment of the 
proposed nuclear tests according to accepted international standards and 
that, unless the assessment establishes that the tests will not give rise to 
radioactive contamination of the marine environment, France refrain from 
conducting these tests; 
(3) that France and New Zealand ensure that no action of any kind is taken 
which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court or 
prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of 
whatever decisions the Court may give in this case." to 
ICJ Decision of 22 September 1995 
The ICJ, in reaching its decision, confined itself to the question in limine: "Do the 
Requests submitted to the Court by the Government of New Zealand on 21 
August 1995 fall within the provisions of para. 63 of the Judgment of the Court 
of 20 December 1974 in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v 
France)?" 11 Referring to the wording of para. 6312 the ICJ considered that within 
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this question there were two separate queries to be answered. The first was: what 
procedure was foreseen by the ICJ in para. 63 when it stated that "the Applicant 
could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions 
of the Statute"? The second was: had the "basis" of the 1974 Judgment been 
"affected" by the French proposals to undergo a course of nuclear tests?13 
The ICJ Decision of 1974: Scope for "Special Procedure "? 
With regard to the first question the ICJ was required to decide whether or not 
para. 63 permitted a "special procedure" which could in effect lead to the re- 
opening of the 1973 action. France argued before the ICJ that New Zealand's 
Request was subject to compliance with the "provisions of the Statute" as stated 
in para. 63 itself. Accordingly, New Zealand could only make either, (a) a request 
for interpretation or revision of the earlier decision, or (b) a new Application 
which, in the French view, would be "out of the question".14 
New Zealand, on the other hand, argued that para. 63 "is a mechanism 
enabling the continuation or the resumption of the proceedings of 1973 and 1974 
... The Court foresaw that the course of future events might in justice require 
that New Zealand should have that opportunity to continue its case, the progress 
of which was stopped in 1974. And to this end the Court authorized these 
derivative proceedings ... the presentation of a Request for such an examination 
is to be part of the same case and not of a new one."15 Contrary to the French 
view, therefore, New Zealand was not seeking either an interpretation of the 
1974 Judgment under Article 60 of the Statute, nor a revision of that Judgment 
under Article 61. 
The ICJ agreed with New Zealand that the term "in accordance with the 
provisions of the Statute" in para. 63 could not have been intended to limit New 
Zealand's procedural entitlements to legal procedures expressly provided for 
under the Statute, such as the filing of a new application, a request for an 
interpretation or a request for revision. The ICJ had not excluded a "special 
procedure" in the event that the circumstances set out in para. 63 had occurred, 
i.e. circumstances which "affected" the "basis" of the Judgment. 
Was the basis of the 1974 Judgment affected? 
The ICJ made it clear that the "special procedure" enabling the 1973 action to be 
continued depended entirely upon whether circumstances affecting the basis of 
the Judgment of 20 December 1974 had arisen. This proved to be the crux of the 
matter. The logical process was to define what the "basis" of the 1974 decision 
was. In making its decision in 1974 the ICJ had found that "for purposes of the 
Application, the New Zealand claim is to be interpreted as applying only to 
atmospheric tests, not to any other form of testing, and as applying only to 
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atmospheric tests so conducted as to give rise to radioactive fall-out on New 
Zealand territory."16 
6 
The reference in the earlier Judgment to atmospheric tests proved crucial. The 
ICJ in 1995 concluded that in 1974 it had addressed the question of whether New 
Zealand, in its application, 
might 
have had broader objectives than the cessation 
of atmospheric nuclear tests. 
1 This possibility, however, had not formed part of 
the Judgment and so the ICJ in 1995 could not re-address this question since its 
sole task was an analysis of the basis of the 1974 Judgment. This had dealt 
exclusively with France's undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric 
nuclear tests. Only if France had resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere 
would the basis of the Judgment have been affected and as this was not the case 
New Zealand's Request did not fall within the provisions of para. 63. The 
Request was consequently dismissed by twelve votes to three. 
Finally the ICJ also dismissed New Zealand's request for provisional 
measures. Also refused were applications for permission to intervene submitted 
by Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Federated 
States of Micronesia together with declarations of intervention made by the last 
four states, all of which proceedings were incidental to New Zealand's main 
request. 
Dissenting Opinions 
Three judges dissented from the majority decision 18 and, although they issued 
separate judgments, a common argument runs through their opinions, namely 
that the ICJ's perspective on the "basis" of the 1974 Judgment was unduly 
restrictive considering that the proposal by France to conduct underground 
nuclear tests would result in nuclear contamination or radioactive fall-out. 
Further, New Zealand's action of 1973 was based on the dangers of nuclear 
testing of whatever kind and similar dangers would result from either 
underground or atmospheric testing. Accordingly, the "basis" of the 1974 
Judgment had been affected.'9 
This line of argument mirrored the submission made by New Zealand in its 
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Request. New Zealand argued that the only type of testing carried out by France 
in the South Pacific prior to the 1973 action was atmospheric. New Zealand's 
statements at the time evidenced a primary concern with fall-out. Therefore, the 
ICJ had "matched" the French undertaking with New Zealand's primary 
concern, namely fall-out from atmospheric testing. In its submission of 1995 
New Zealand called for recognition that times had changed: "Had the Court 
realised in 1974 that a shift to underground testing would raise the same 
concerns, then, doubtless, the 'matching' would not have been made."2° The ICJ 
had no evidence of the detrimental effects of underground testing in 1974 and so 
thought the match to be adequate. Now evidence of that kind was to hand and, 
accordingly, the basis of the earlier judgment had been affected.21 
New Zealand presented a wide range of scientific evidence to illustrate the 
dangers of 
underground testing and, 
in particular, the possible ramifications for 
the atmosphere.2 In addition it pointed to French admissions of radioactive 
releases resulting from previous testsz3 as well as French recognition that in 1979 
a nuclear device, being tested in the South Pacific and having become stuck in the 
detonation shaft, had to be detonated at less than the intended depth.24 This 
evidence was in the end not considered by the ICJ which did not address any 
arguments beyond the procedural basis of New Zealand's Request. 
The Precautionary Principle 
In his dissenting Opinion, Judge Weeramantry expressed regret that the ICJ had 
not availed itself of the opportunity to consider the precautionary principle. 25 
This statement was presumably in response to New Zealand's Request which 
called upon the ICJ to apply the principle. 
The status of the precautionary principle in international law is not precisely 
defined.26 New Zealand, in an attempt to explain its effect, argued in its 
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submission that, "in situations that may possibly be significantly environmen- 
tally threatening, the burden is placed upon the party seeking to carry out the 
conduct that could give rise to environmental damage to prove that that conduct 
will not lead to such a result This assertion that the precautionary principle in 
effect reverses the normal burden of proof has been described as its strongest 
formulation and is not necessarily the accepted interpretation of the principle in 
international law.28 
New Zealand, advancing the precautionary principle, argued that before 
France could carry out underground nuclear tests leading to deposit and storage 
of radioactive wastes near the marine environment "it must provide evidence 
that the tests will not result in the introduction of any radioactive material to that 
environment". An obligation which would require the carrying out of a full 
Environmental Impact Assessment in accordance with international standards.29 
Contrary to the opinion of Judge Weeramantry, however, the majority 
interpretation of para. 63 of the 1974 Judgment led the ICJ to the conclusion that 
a prima facie case had not been established by New Zealand, thus precluding 
examination of this and other moot points. 
Conclusion 
This case breaks new ground in the acceptance by the ICJ that it had created, in 
its 1974 Judgment, scope for a special procedure not necessarily provided for 
expressly in the Statute.3° By including para. 63 in its earlier Judgment, the ICJ 
had, New Zealand submitted "exercised inherent powers to preserve its 
jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances".31 The ICJ appears to accept that 
this is the case despite deciding that in this instance the procedure does not apply. 
The case also highlights the increasing demands in international environmental 
law for both the application of the precautionary principle and for Environ- 
mental Impact Assessments to be carried out where activities are planned which 
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may be environmentally dangerous. 32 The common theme in these demands is 
for prior assessment where these risks arise. Again, however, in spite of the 
emphasis given in New Zealand's pleadings to the legal requirement of prior 
assessment, the procedural basis of the ICJ's decision precluded a full analysis of 
this argument. 
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